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Finite Model Approximations and Asymptotic
Optimality of Quantized Policies in Decentralized
Stochastic Control
Naci Saldi, Serdar Yüksel, Tamás Linder
Abstract—In this paper, we consider finite model approxi-
mations of a large class of static and dynamic team problems
where these models are constructed through uniform quan-
tization of the observation and action spaces of the agents.
The strategies obtained from these finite models are shown to
approximate the optimal cost with arbitrary precision under
mild technical assumptions. In particular, quantized team policies
are asymptotically optimal. This result is then applied to Wit-
senhausen’s celebrated counterexample and the Gaussian relay
channel problem. For the Witsenhausen’s counterexample, our
approximation approach provides, to our knowledge, the first
rigorously established result that one can construct an ε-optimal
strategy for any ε > 0 through a solution of a simpler problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Team decision theory has its roots in control theory and
economics. Marschak [1] was perhaps the first to introduce
the basic elements of teams and to provide the first steps
toward the development of a team theory. Radner [2] provided
foundational results for static teams, establishing connections
between person-by-person optimality, stationarity, and team-
optimality. The work of Witsenhausen [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] on
dynamic teams and characterization of information structures
has been crucial in the progress of our understanding of
dynamic teams. Further discussion on the design of informa-
tion structures in the context of team theory and economics
applications are given in [8] and [9], among a rich collection
of other contributions not listed here.
Establishing the existence and structure of optimal policies
is a challenging problem. Existence of optimal policies for
static and a class of sequential dynamic teams has been studied
recently in [10]. More specific setups and non-existence results
have been studied in [11], [12]. For a class of teams which
are convex, one can reduce the search space to a smaller
parametric class of policies (see [2], [13], [14], and for a
comprehensive review, see [15]).
In this paper, our aim is to study the approximation of static
and dynamic team problems using finite models which are
obtained through the uniform discretization, on a finite grid,
of the observation and action spaces of agents. In particular,
we are interested in the asymptotic optimality of quantized
policies.
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In the literature relatively few results are available on
approximating static or dynamic team problems. We can only
refer the reader to [16], [17]–[22] and a few references therein.
With the exception of [20]–[22], these works in general study
a specific setup (the Witsenhausen counterexample) and are
mostly experimental; that is, they do not rigorously prove the
convergence of approximate solutions.
In [20], [22], a class of static team problems are considered
and the existence of smooth optimal strategies is studied.
Under fairly strong assumptions, the existence of an optimal
strategy with Lipschitz continuous partial derivatives up to
some order is proved. By using this result, an error bound on
the accuracy of near optimal solutions is established, where
near optimal strategies are expressed as linear combinations
of basis functions with adjustable parameters. In [21], the
same authors investigated the approximation problem for
Witsenhausen’s counterexample, which does not satisfy the
conditions in [20], [22]; the authors derived an analogous
error bound on the accuracy of the near optimal solutions. For
the result in [21] both the error bound and the near optimal
solutions depend on the knowledge of the optimal strategy
for Witsenhausen’s counterexample. Moreover, the method
devised in [21] implicitly corresponds to the discretization of
only the action spaces of the agents. Therefore, it involves
only the approximation with regard to the action space, and
does not correspond to a tractable approximation for the set
of policies/strategies.
Particular attention has been paid in the literature to Witsen-
hausen’s counterexample. This problem has puzzled the con-
trol community for more than 40 years with its philosophical
impact demonstrating the challenges that arise due to a non-
classical information structure, and its formidable difficulty in
obtaining an optimal or suboptimal solution. In fact, optimal
policies and their value are still unknown, even though the
existence of an optimal policy has been established using
various methods [10]–[12]. Some relevant results on obtaining
approximate solutions can be found in [16]–[19], [21], [23],
[24]. Certain lower bounds, that are not tight, building on
information theoretic approaches are available in [25], see also
[26]. In this paper, we show that finite models obtained through
the uniform quantization of the observation and action spaces
lead to a sequence of policies whose cost values converge to
the optimal cost. Thus, with high enough computation power,
one could guarantee that for any ε > 0, an ε-optimal policy
can be constructed.
We note that the operation of quantization has typically been
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than an optimal linear policy, both for Witsenhausen’s coun-
terexample [17], [24] and another interesting model known as
the Gaussian relay channel problem [27], [28]. Our findings
show that for a large class of problems, quantized policies not
only may perform better than linear policies, but that they are
actually almost optimal.
We finally note that although finding optimal solutions
for finite models for Witsenhausen’s counterexample as the
ones constructed in this paper was shown to be NP-complete
in [29], the task is still computationally less demanding
than the method used in [21]. Loosely speaking, to obtain
a near optimal solution using the method in [21], one has
to compute the optimal partitions of the observation spaces
and the optimal representation points in the action spaces.
In contrast, the partitions of the observation spaces and the
available representation points in the action spaces used by
our method are known a priori. We also note that if one can
establish smoothness properties of optimal policies such as
differentiability or Lipschitz continuity (e.g., as in [22]), the
methods developed in our paper can be used to provide rates
of convergence for the sequence of finite solutions as the finite
models are successively refined.
Contributions of the paper. (i) We establish that finite
models asymptotically represent the true models in the sense
that the solutions obtained by solving such finite models
lead to cost values that converge to the optimal cost of the
original model. Thus, our approach can be viewed to be
constructive; even though the computational complexity is
typically at least exponential in the cardinality of the finite
model. (ii) The approximation approach here provides, to our
knowledge, the first rigorously established result showing that
one can construct an ε-optimal strategy for any ε > 0 through
an explicit solution of a simpler problem for a large class
of static and dynamic team problems, in particular for the
Witsenhausen’s celebrated counterexample.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we review the definition of Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model
for sequential team problems. In Section III-A we consider
finite observation approximations of static team problems with
compact observation spaces and bounded cost, and prove
the asymptotic optimality of strategies obtained from finite
models. In Section III-B an analogous approximation result is
obtained for static team problems with non-compact observa-
tion spaces and unbounded cost functions. In Section IV we
consider finite observation approximations of dynamic team
problems via the static reduction method. In Sections V and
VI we apply the results derived in Section IV to study finite ob-
servation space approximations of Witsenhausen’s celebrated
counterexample and the Gaussian relay channel. Discretization
of the action spaces is considered in Section VII. Section VIII
concludes the paper.
II. SEQUENTIAL TEAMS AND CHARACTERIZATION OF
INFORMATION STRUCTURES
In this section, we introduce the model as laid out by
Witsenhausen, called the Intrinsic Model [4]; see [15] for a
more comprehensive overview and further characterizations
and classifications of information structures. In this model,
any action applied at any given time is regarded as applied
by an individual agent, who acts only once. One advantage of
this model, in addition to its generality, is that the definitions
regarding information structures can be compactly described.
Suppose that in the decentralized system, there is a pre-
defined order in which the agents act. Such systems are
called sequential systems (for non-sequential teams, we refer
the reader to [30], [31] and [32], in addition to [7]). In
the following, all spaces are assumed to be Borel spaces
(i.e., Borel subsets of complete and separable metric spaces)
endowed with Borel σ-algebras. In the context of a sequential
system, the Intrinsic Model has the following components:
• A collection of measurable spaces I :={
(Ω,F), (Ui,U i), (Yi,Yi), i ∈ N}, specifying the
system’s distinguishable events, and the action and
measurement spaces. Here |N | := N is the number of
actions taken, and each of these actions is supposed to be
taken by an individual agent (hence, an agent with perfect
recall can also be regarded as a separate decision maker
every time it acts). The pair (Ω,F) is a measurable
space on which an underlying probability can be defined.
The pair (Ui,U i) denotes the measurable space from
which the action ui of Agent i is selected. The pair
(Yi,Yi) denotes the measurement (or observation) space
of Agent i.
• A measurement constraint which establishes the connec-
tion between the observation variables and the system’s
distinguishable events. The Yi-valued observation vari-
ables are given by yi ∼ ηi( · |ω,ui−1), where ui−1 =
(u1, . . . , ui−1), ηi is a stochastic kernel on Yi given
Ω×∏i−1j=1 Uj , and uk denotes the action of Agent k.
• A design constraint, which restricts the set of admissible
N -tuple control strategies γ = {γ1, γ2, . . . , γN}, also
called policies, to the set of all measurable functions, so
that ui = γi(yi), where γi is a measurable function. Let
Γi denote the set of all admissible policies for Agent i
and let Γ =
∏
k Γ
k
.
• A probability measure P defined on (Ω,F) which de-
scribes the measures on the random events in the model.
We note that the intrinsic model of Witsenhausen gives a
set-theoretic characterization of information fields; however,
for Borel spaces, the model above is equivalent to the intrinsic
model for sequential team problems.
Under this intrinsic model, a sequential team problem is
dynamic if the information available to at least one agent
is affected by the action of at least one other agent. A
decentralized problem is static, if the information available at
every decision maker is only affected by state of the nature;
that is, no other decision maker can affect the information at
any given decision maker.
Information structures (ISs) can also be classified as classi-
cal, quasi-classical, and nonclassical. An IS is classical if yi
contains all of the information available to Agent k for k < i.
An IS is quasi-classical or partially nested, if whenever uk
(for some k < i) affects yi, then Agent i has access to yk. An
IS which is not partially nested is nonclassical.
3For any γ = (γ1, · · · , γN ), we let the cost of the team
problem be defined by
J(γ) := E[c(ω,y,u)],
for some measurable cost function c : Ω×∏i Yi×∏i Ui → R,
where u := (u1, . . . , uN) = γ(y) and y := (y1, . . . , yN).
Definition 1. For a given stochastic team problem, a policy
(strategy) γ∗ := (γ1∗, . . . , γN ∗) ∈ Γ is an optimal team
decision rule if
J(γ∗) = inf
γ∈Γ
J(γ) =: J∗.
The cost level J∗ achieved by this strategy is the optimal team
cost.
Definition 2. For a given stochastic team problem, a policy
γ∗ := (γ1∗, . . . , γN∗) constitutes a Nash equilibrium (syn-
onymously, a person-by-person optimal solution) if, for all
β ∈ Γi and all i ∈ N , the following inequalities hold:
J∗ := J(γ∗) ≤ J(γ−i∗, β),
where we have adopted the notation
(γ−i∗, β) := (γ1
∗
, . . . , γi−1
∗
, β, γi+1
∗
, . . . , γN
∗
).
Unless otherwise specified, the term ‘measurable’ will refer
to Borel measurability in the rest of the paper. In what
follows, the terms policy, measurement, and agent are used
synonymously with strategy, observation, and decision maker,
respectively.
A. Auxiliary Results
In this section, for the ease of reference we state some well-
known results in measure theory and functional analysis that
will be frequently used in the paper.
The first theorem is Lusin’s theorem which roughly states
that any measurable function is almost continuous.
Theorem 1. (Lusin’s Theorem [33, Theorem 7.5.2]) Let E1 and
E2 be two Borel spaces and let µ be a probability measure on
E1. Let f be a measurable function from E1 into E2. Then, for
any ε > 0 there is a closed set F ⊂ E1 such that µ(E1\F ) < ε
and the restriction of f to F is continuous.
The second theorem is the Dugundji extension theorem
which is a generalization of the Tietze extension theorem [33].
Theorem 2. (Dugundji Extension Theorem [34, Theorem 7.4])
Let E1 be a Borel space and let F be a closed subset of E1. Let
E2 be a convex subset of some locally convex vector space.
Then any continuous f : F → E2 has a continuous extension
on E1.
The next theorem originally states that the closed convex
hull of a compact subset in a locally convex vector space is
compact if the vector space is completely metrizable. Since
the closure of a convex set is convex and a closed subset of
a compact set is compact, we can state the theorem in the
following form.
Theorem 3. [35, Theorem 5.35] In a completely metrizable
locally convex vector space E, the closed convex hull of a
compact set is convex and compact. The same statement also
holds when E is replaced with any of its closed and convex
subsets.
III. APPROXIMATION OF STATIC TEAM PROBLEMS
In this section, we consider the finite observation approx-
imation of static team problems. In what follows, the static
team problem is formulated in a state-space form which can
be reduced to the intrinsic model introduced in Section II.
Let
(
X,X ,P) be a probability space representing the state
space, where X is a Borel space and X is its Borel σ-algebra.
We consider an N -agent static team problem in which Agent
i, i = 1, . . . , N , observes a random variable yi and takes an
action ui, where yi takes values in a Borel space Yi and ui
takes values in a Borel space Ui. Given any state realization
x, the random variable yi has a distribution W i( · |x); that is,
W i( · |x) is a stochastic kernel on Yi given X [36].
The team cost function c is a non-negative function of the
state, observations, and actions; that is, c : X×Y×U→ [0,∞),
where Y :=
∏N
i=1 Y
i and U :=
∏N
i=1 U
i
. For Agent i, the set
of strategies Γi is given by
Γi :=
{
γi : Yi → Ui, γi is measurable}.
Recall that Γ =
∏N
i=1 Γ
i
. Then, the cost of the team J : Γ→
[0,∞) is given by
J(γ) =
∫
X×Y
c(x,y,u)P(dx, dy),
where u = γ(y). Here, with an abuse of notation,
P(dx, dy) := P(dx)
∏N
i=1W
i(dyi|x) denotes the joint dis-
tribution of the state and observations. Therefore, we have
J∗ = inf
γ∈Γ
J(γ).
With these definitions, we first consider the case where
the observation spaces are compact and the cost function is
bounded. In the second part, teams with non-compact obser-
vation spaces and unbounded cost function will be studied.
A. Approximation of Static Teams with Compact Observation
Spaces and Bounded Cost
In this section, we consider the finite observation approx-
imation of static team problems with compact observation
spaces and bounded cost function. We impose the following
assumptions on the components of the model.
Assumption 1.
(a) The cost function c is bounded. In addition, it is contin-
uous in u and y for any fixed x.
(b) For each i, Ui is a convex subset of a locally convex
vector space.
(c) For each i, Yi is compact.
We first prove that the minimum cost achievable by contin-
uous strategies is equal to the optimal cost J∗. To this end,
for each i, we define Γic :=
{
γi ∈ Γi : γi is continuous} and
Γc :=
∏N
i=1 Γ
i
c.
Proposition 1. We have
inf
γ∈Γc
J(γ) = J∗.
4Proof. Let γ ∈ Γ. We prove that there exists a sequence{
γ
k
}
k≥1 ∈ Γc such that J(γk) → J(γ) as k → ∞, which
implies the proposition. Let µi denote the distribution of yi.
For each k ≥ 1, by Lusin’s theorem, there is a closed set
Fk,i ⊂ Yi such that µi
(
Yi \ Fk,i
)
< 1/k and the restriction
of γi to Fk,i is continuous. Let us denote piik = γi
∣∣
Fk,i
, and
so piik : Fk,i → Ui is continuous. By the Dugundji extension
theorem, there exists a continuous extension γik : Yi → Ui
of piik. Therefore, γk = (γ
1
k, . . . , γ
N
k ) ∈ Γc and we have for
Fk :=
∏N
i=1 Fk,i the following∣∣J(γ)−J(γ
k
)
∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∫
X×Y
[
c(x,y, γ)− c(x,y, γ
k
)
]
P(dx, dy)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
X×(Y\Fk)
∣∣c(x,y, γ)− c(x,y, γ
k
)
∣∣ P(dx, dy)
≤ 2‖c‖ P(X× (Y \ Fk)),
where ‖c‖ is the maximum absolute value that c takes. Since
P
(
X × (Y \ Fk)
) ≤ ∑Ni=1 µi(Yi \ Fk,i) ≤ N/k, we have
limk→∞ J(γk) = J(γ). This completes the proof.
Let di denote the metric on Yi. Since Yi is compact, one
can find a finite set Yin :=
{
yi,1, . . . , yi,in
} ⊂ Yi such that
Yin is an 1/n-net in Yi; that is, for any y ∈ Yi we have
min
z∈Yin
di(y, z) <
1
n
.
Define function qin mapping Yi to Yin by
qin(y) := argmin
z∈Yin
di(y, z),
where ties are broken so that qin is measurable. In the literature,
qin is called the nearest neighborhood quantizer [37]. If Yi =
[−M,M ] for some M ∈ R+, one can choose the finite set Yin
such that qin becomes a uniform quantizer. For any γi ∈ Γi,
we let γn,i denote the strategy γi ◦ qin. Define
Γin := Γ
i ◦ qin.
We let Γn :=
∏N
i=1 Γ
i
n. The following theorem states that an
optimal (or almost optimal) policy can be approximated with
arbitrarily small approximation error for the induced costs by
policies in Γn, for n sufficiently large.
Theorem 4. We have
lim
n→∞ infγ∈Γn
J(γ) = J∗.
Proof. For any ε, let γ
ε
= (γ1ε , . . . , γ
N
ε ) ∈ Γc denote an ε-
optimal continuous strategy. The existence of such a strategy
follows from Proposition 1. Then, we have
inf
γ∈Γn
J(γ)− J∗ = inf
γ∈Γn
J(γ)− inf
γ∈Γc
J(γ) (by Proposition 1)
≤ J(γ
ε,n
)− inf
γ∈Γc
J(γ)
≤ ε+ (J(γ
ε,n
)− J(γ
ε
)
)
,
where γ
ε,n
= (γn,1ε , . . . , γ
n,N
ε ). Note that c(x,y, γε,n(y)) →
c(x,y, γ
ε
(y)) as n → ∞, for all (x,y) ∈ X × Y since c
is continuous in u and γ
ε
∈ Γc. Hence, by the dominated
convergence theorem the second term in the last expression
converges to zero as n → ∞. Since ε is arbitrary, this
completes the proof.
For each n, define stochastic kernels W in( · |x) on Yin given
X as follows:
W in( · |x) :=
in∑
j=1
W (Sni,j |x)δyi,j ( · ),
where Sni,j :=
{
y ∈ Yi : qin(y) = yi,j
}
. Let Πin :=
{
pii :
Yin → Ui, pii measurable
}
and Πn :=
∏N
i=1 Π
i
n. Define Jn :
Πn → [0,∞) as
Jn(pi) :=
∫
X×Yn
c(x,y,u)Pn(dx, dy),
where pi = (pi1, . . . , piN ), u = pi(y), Yn =
∏N
i=1 Y
i
n, and
Pn(dx, dy) = P(dx)
∏N
i=1W
i
n(dy
i|x).
Lemma 1. Let {pin} be a sequence of strategies such that
pin ∈ Πn. For each n, define γn := pin ◦ qn, where qn :=
(q1n, . . . , q
N
n ). Then, we have
lim
n→∞ |Jn(pin)− J(γn)| = 0.
Proof. We have
|Jn(pin)− J(γn)|
=
∣∣∣∣ ∫
X×Y
c(x, qn(y), γn) dP−
∫
X×Y
c(x,y, γ
n
) dP
∣∣∣∣
which converges to zero as n→∞ by dominated convergence
theorem and the fact that c is bounded and continuous in y.
The following theorem is the main result of this section
which is a consequence of Theorem 4. It states that to compute
a near optimal strategy for the original team problem, it is
sufficient to compute an optimal (or almost optimal if optimal
does not exist) strategy for the team problem described above.
Theorem 5. For any ε > 0, there exists a sufficiently large n
such that the optimal (or almost optimal) policy pi∗ ∈ Πn for
the cost Jn is ε-optimal for the original team problem when
pi∗ = (pi1∗, . . . , piN∗) is extended to Y via γi = pii∗ ◦ qin.
Proof. Fix any ε > 0. By Theorem 4, there exists a se-
quence of strategies {γ
n
} such that γ
n
∈ Γn (n ≥ 1) and
limn→∞ J(γn) = J
∗
. Define pin as the restriction of γn to
the set Yn. Then, we have
J∗ = lim
n→∞ J(γn)
= lim
n→∞ Jn(pin) (by Lemma 1)
≥ lim sup
n→∞
inf
pi∈Πn
Jn(pi).
For the reverse inequality, for each n ≥ 1, let pin ∈ Πn
be such that Jn(pin) < infpi∈Πn Jn(pi) + 1/n. Define γn :=
pin ◦ qn. Then, we have
lim inf
n→∞ infpi∈Πn
Jn(pi) = lim inf
n→∞ Jn(pin)
= lim inf
n→∞ J(γn) (by Lemma 1)
5≥ J∗.
This completes the proof.
B. Approximation of Static Teams with Noncompact Observa-
tion Spaces and Unbounded Cost
In this section, we consider the finite observation approxi-
mation of static team problems with noncompact observation
spaces and unbounded cost function. We impose the following
assumptions on the components of the model.
Assumption 2.
(a) The cost function c is continuous in u and y for any fixed
x. In addition, it is bounded on any compact subset of
X× Y × U.
(b) For each i, Ui is a closed and convex subset of a
completely metrizable locally convex vector space.
(c) For each i, Yi is locally compact.
(d) For any subset G of U, we let wG(x,y) :=
supu∈G c(x,y,u). We assume that wG is integrable with
respect to P(dx, dy), for any compact subset G of U of
the form G =
∏N
i=1G
i
.
(e) For any γ ∈ Γ with J(γ) < ∞ and each i ∈ N , there
exists ui,∗ ∈ Ui such that we have J(γ−i, γiui,∗) < ∞,
where γiui,∗ ≡ ui,∗.
Remark 1. Note that Assumption 2-(d),(e) hold if the cost
function is bounded. Therefore, if the static team problem
satisfies Assumption 1, then Assumption 2 (except (b)) holds
as well. Hence, the results derived in this section almost
includes the results proved in Section III-A as a particular
case. However, since the analysis in this section is somewhat
involved, we presented the compact and bounded case as a
separate section.
The following result states that there exists a near optimal
strategy whose range is convex and compact. In what follows,
for any compact subset G of U, we let
ΓG :=
{
γ ∈ Γ : γ(Y) ⊂ G}.
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumption 2-(a),(b),(c),(e) hold. Then,
for any ε > 0, there exists a compact subset G of U of the
form G =
∏N
i=1G
i
, where each Gi is convex and compact,
such that
inf
γ∈ΓG
J(γ) < J∗ + ε.
Proof. Fix any ε > 0. Let γ ∈ Γ with J(γ) < J∗ + ε/2. We
construct the desired G iteratively.
By Assumption 2-(e) there exists u1,∗ ∈ U1 such that
J(γ−1, γ1u1,∗) <∞. Let G1 ⊂ U1 be a compact set containing
u1,∗. We define
γ˜(y1) =
{
γ1(y1), if γ1(y1) ∈ G1
u1,∗, otherwise.
Define also γ
1
:= (γ˜1, γ2, . . . , γN), M1 :=
{
y1 ∈ Y1 :
γ1(y1) ∈ G1}, and u˜1 = γ˜(y1). Then, we have
|J(γ)− J(γ
1
)|
=
∣∣∣∣E[c(x,y,u)1{y1∈M1}]+ E[c(x,y,u)1{y1 /∈M1}]
− E[c(x,y,u−1, u˜1)1{y1∈M1}]
− E[c(x,y,u−1, u˜1)1{y1 /∈M1}]∣∣∣∣
≤ E[c(x,y,u)1{y1 /∈M1}]+ E[c(x,y,u−1, u˜1)1{y1 /∈M1}]
=
∫
X×Y×U−1×(G1)c
c(x,y,u) δγ(du) P(dx, dy)
+
∫
X×Y×U−1×(G1)c
c(x,y,u) δ(γ−1,γ1
u1,∗
)(du) P(dx, dy),
where Dc denotes the complement of the set D, δz denotes
the point mass at z, and U−1 =
∏N
i=2 U
i
. Recall that
J(γ−1, γ1u1,∗) < ∞ by Assumption 2-(e). Hence, the last
expression can be made smaller than ε2N by properly choosing
G1 since U1 is a Borel space [38, Theorem 3.2]. Since the
closed convex hull of the set G1 is compact by Theorem 3,
we can indeed take G1 convex without loss of generality. By
replacing γ with γ
1
and applying the same method as above,
we can obtain γ
2
, and a convex and compact G2 ⊂ U2 such
that |J(γ
1
)− J(γ
2
)| ≤ ε2N and γ2(Y2) ⊂ G2.
Continuing this way , we obtain G =
∏N
i=1G
i and γ
N
∈
ΓG such that
∣∣J(γ) − J(γ
N
)
∣∣ < ε/2, where Gi is convex
and compact for all i = 1, . . . , N . Hence, we have J(γ
N
) <
J∗ + ε, completing the proof.
Recall that Γc denotes the set of continuous strategies. For
any G ⊂ U, we define Γc,G := Γc ∩ ΓG; that is, Γc,G is the
set of continuous strategies having range inside G.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then, for any
ε > 0, there exists a compact subset G of U of the form
G =
∏N
i=1G
i
, where each Gi is convex and compact, such
that
inf
γ∈Γc,G
J(γ) < J∗ + ε.
Proof. Fix any ε > 0. By Lemma 2, there exists a compact
subset G =
∏N
i=1G
i of U, where Gi is convex and compact,
and γ ∈ ΓG such that
J(γ) < J∗ +
ε
2
.
Recall that µi denotes the distribution of yi.
Let δ > 0 which will be specified later. Analogous to the
proof of Proposition 1, we construct a continuous strategy γ˜
which is almost equal to γ. For each i, Lusin’s theorem implies
the existence of a closed set Fi ⊂ Yi such that µi
(
Yi\Fi
)
< δ
and the restriction, denoted by pii, of γi on Fi is continuous.
By the Dugundji extension theorem there exists a continuous
extension γ˜i : Yi → Gi of pii. Therefore, γ˜ = (γ˜1, . . . , γ˜N) ∈
Γc,G. Let F :=
∏N
i=1 Fi. Then, we have
P
(
X× (Y \ F )) ≤ N∑
i=1
P
(
X× Y−i × (Yi \ Fi)
)
≤
N∑
i=1
δ = Nδ.
6Hence, we obtain∣∣J(γ)−J(γ˜)∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∫
X×Y
[
c(x,y, γ)− c(x,y, γ˜)]P(dx, dy)∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
X×(Y\F )
[
c(x,y, γ) + c(x,y, γ˜)
]
P(dx, dy)
≤ 2
∫
X×(Y\F )
wG(x,y) P(dx, dy).
By Assumption 2-(d) wG is P-integrable so that the measure
wG(x,y)P(dx, dy) is absolutely continuous with respect to P.
Since P
(
X× (Y \ F ))→ 0 as δ → 0, we obtain∫
X×(Y\F )
wG(x,y) P(dx, dy) → 0 as δ → 0.
Since J(γ) < J∗ + ε2 , there exists a sufficiently small δ > 0
such that J(γ˜) < J∗ + ε. This completes the proof.
Since for each i, Yi is a locally compact separable metric
space, there exists a nested sequence of compact sets {Kil}
such that Kil ⊂ intKil+1 and Yi =
⋃∞
l=1 K
i
l [35, Lemma 2.76],
where intD denotes the interior of the set D.
Recall that di denotes the metric on Yi. For each l ≥ 1, let
Yil,n :=
{
yi,1, . . . , yi,il,n
} ⊂ Kil be an 1/n-net in Kil. Recall
that if Yil,n is an 1/n-net in Kil, then for any y ∈ Kil we have
min
z∈Yi
l,n
di(y, z) <
1
n
.
For each l and n, let qil,n : Kil → Yil,n be the nearest
neighborhood quantizer; that is, for any y ∈ Kil
qil,n(y) = argmin
z∈Yi
l,n
di(y, z),
where ties are broken so that qil,n is measurable. If Kil =
[−M,M ] ⊂ Yi = R for some M ∈ R+, the finite set Yil,n
can be chosen such that qil,n becomes an uniform quantizer.
We let Qil,n : Yi → Yil,n denote the extension of qil,n to Yi
given by
Qil,n(y) :=
{
qil,n(y), if y ∈ Kil,
yi,0, otherwise,
where yi,0 ∈ Yi is some auxiliary element. Define Γil,n = Γi ◦
Qil,n ⊂ Γi; that is, Γil,n is defined to be the set of all strategies
γ˜i ∈ Γi of the form γ˜i = γi◦Qil,n, where γi ∈ Γi. Define also
Γl,n :=
∏N
i=1 Γ
i
l,n ⊂ Γ. The following theorem states that an
optimal (or almost optimal) policy can be approximated with
arbitrarily small approximation error for the induced costs by
policies in Γl,n for sufficiently large l and n.
Theorem 6. For any ε > 0, there exist (l, n(l)) and γ ∈ Γl,n(l)
such that
J(γ) < J∗ + ε.
Proof. By Proposition 2, there exists γ ∈ Γc,G such that
J(γ) < J∗+ε/4, where G =
∏N
i=1G
i and each Gi is convex
and compact. For each l and n, we define γil,n := γi ◦ Qil,n
and γ
l,n
= (γ1l,n, . . . , γ
N
l,n). Define also ui,∗ := γi(yi,0) ∈ Gi.
Let N ∗ denote the collection of all subsets of N except the
empty set. For any s ∈ N ∗, we define
us,∗ :=
(
ui,∗
)
i∈s, γus,∗ :=
(
γiui,∗
)
i∈s, γ
−s :=
(
γi
)
i/∈s,
and
Ksl :=
∏
i∈s
(
Kil
)c ×∏
i/∈s
Kil.
Recall that γiui,∗ is the strategy which maps any y
i ∈ Yi to
ui,∗. Let Kl =
∏N
i=1 K
i
l and observe that
(X× Kl)c =
⋃
s∈N∗
Ksl .
Note that since the range of the strategy (γ−s, γ
us,∗
)
is contained in G, we have J(γ−s, γ
us,∗
) ≤∫
X×Y wG(x,y)P(dx, dy) < ∞ for all s ∈ N ∗ by
Assumption 2-(d). Hence, there exists a sufficiently large l
such that∣∣∣∣J(γ)− ∫
X×Kl
c(x,y, γ)P(dx, dy)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε4 ,
and∫
X×Ks
l
c(x,y, γ−s, γ
us,∗
)P(dx, dy) ≤ ε
2N+1
, for all s ∈ N ∗.
Let q−sl,n =
(
qil,n
)
i/∈s. Then, we have
lim sup
n→∞
|J(γ)− J(γ
l,n
)| ≤
∣∣∣∣J(γ)− ∫
X×Kl
c(x,y, γ) dP
∣∣∣∣
+ lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∫
X×Kl
c(x,y, γ) dP−
∫
X×Kl
c(x,y, γ
l,n
) dP
∣∣∣∣
+
∑
s∈N∗
lim sup
n→∞
∫
X×Ks
l
c(x,y, γ−s ◦ q−sl,n , γus,∗) dP
≤ ε
4
+ lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∫
X×Kl
c(x,y, γ)dP−
∫
X×Kl
c(x,y, γ
l,n
)dP
∣∣∣∣
+
∑
s∈N∗
lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∫
X×Ks
l
c(x,y, γ−s ◦ q−sl,n , γus,∗) dP
−
∫
X×Ks
l
c(x,y, γ−s, γ
us,∗
) dP
∣∣∣∣
+
∑
s∈N∗
∫
X×Ks
l
c(x,y, γ−s, γ
us,∗
) dP
≤ ε
4
+
∑
s∈N∗
ε
2N+1
+ lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∫
X×Kl
c(x,y, γ) dP−
∫
X×Kl
c(x,y, γ
l,n
) dP
∣∣∣∣
+
∑
s∈N∗
lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∫
X×Ks
l
c(x,y, γ−s ◦ q−sl,n , γus,∗) dP
−
∫
X×Ks
l
c(x,y, γ−s, γ
us,∗
) dP
∣∣∣∣.
Note that in the last expression, the integrands in the third and
fourth terms are less than wG. Since wG is P-integrable by
Assumption 2-(d), γi ◦ qil,n → γi on Kil as n → ∞ (recall
7that γi is continuous), and c is continuous in u, the third and
fourth terms in the last expression converge to zero as n →
∞ by dominated convergence theorem. Hence, there exists a
sufficiently large n(l) such that the last expression becomes
less than 3ε/4. Therefore, J(γ
l,n(l)
) < J∗+ε, completing the
proof.
The above result implies that to compute a near optimal
policy for the team problem it is sufficient to choose a strategy
based on the quantized observations
(
Q1l,n(y
1), . . . , QNl,n(y
N )
)
for sufficiently large l and n. Furthermore, this nearly optimal
strategy can have a compact range of the form G =
∏N
i=1G
i
,
where Gi is convex and compact for each i = 1, . . . , N .
However, to obtain a result analogous to the Theorem 5,
we need to impose a further assumption. To this end, we
first introduce a finite observation model. For each (l, n), let
Zil,n := {yi,0, yi,1, . . . , yi,il,n} (i.e., the output levels of Qil,n)
and define the stochastic kernels W il,n( · |x) on Zil,n given X
as follows:
W il,n( · |x) :=
il,n∑
j=0
W (Sl,ni,j |x)δyi,j ( · ),
where Sl,ni,j :=
{
y ∈ Yi : Qil,n(y) = yi,j
}
. Let Πin,l :=
{
pii :
Zil,n → Ui, pii measurable
}
and Πl,n :=
∏N
i=1 Π
i
l,n. Define
Jl,n : Πl,n → [0,∞) as
Jl,n(pi) :=
∫
X×Zl,n
c(x,y,u)Pl,n(dx, dy),
where pi = (pi1, . . . , piN ), u = pi(y), Zl,n =
∏N
i=1 Z
i
l,n,
and Pl,n(dx, dy) = P(dx)
∏N
i=1W
i
l,n(dy
i|x). Note that the
probability measure Pl,n can also be treated as a measure on
X×Y. In this case, it is not difficult to prove that Pl,n converges
to P weakly as l, n → ∞. For any compact subset G of U,
we also define ΠGl,n := {pi ∈ Πl,n : pi(Zl,n) ⊂ G}.
Assumption 3. For any compact subset G of U of the form
G =
∏N
i=1G
i
, we assume that the function wG is uniformly
integrable with respect to the measures {Pl,n}; that is,
lim
R→∞
sup
l,n
∫
{wG>R}
wG(x,y) dPl,n = 0.
Lemma 3. Let {pil,n} be a sequence of strategies such that
pil,n ∈ ΠGl,n, where G =
∏N
i=1G
i and each Gi is convex and
compact. For each l and n, define γ
l,n
:= pil,n ◦Ql,n, where
Ql,n := (Q
1
l,n, . . . , Q
N
l,n). Then, we have
lim
l,n→∞
|Jl,n(pil,n)− J(γl,n)| = 0.
Proof. Let us introduce the following finite measures on X×Y:
µG(S) :=
∫
S
wG(x,y) dP,
µl,nG (S) :=
∫
S
wG(x,y) dPl,n.
Since Pl,n converges to P weakly, by [41, Theorem 3.5] and
Assumption 3 we have µl,nG → µG weakly as l, n → ∞.
Hence, the sequence {µl,nG } is tight. Therefore, there exists a
compact subset K of X × Y such that µG(Kc) < ε/2 and
µl,nG (K
c) < ε/2 for all l, n. Then, we have
|Jl,n(pil,n)− J(γl,n)|
=
∣∣∣∣ ∫
X×Y
c(x,Ql,n(y), γl,n) dP−
∫
X×Y
c(x,y, γ
l,n
) dP
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
K
∣∣c(x,Ql,n(y), γl,n)− c(x,y, γl,n)∣∣ dP
+
∫
Kc
wG(x,y) dP+
∫
Kc
wG(x,y) dPl,n
The first term in the last expression goes to zero as l, n →
∞ by dominated convergence theorem and the fact that c is
bounded and continuous in y. The second term is less than ε.
Since ε is arbitrary, this completes the proof.
The following theorem is the main result of this section
which is a consequence of Theorem 6. It states that to compute
a near optimal strategy for the original team problem, it is
sufficient to compute an optimal (or an almost optimal policy
if an optimal one does not exist) policy for the team problem
described above.
Theorem 7. Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Then, for
any ε > 0, there exists a pair (l, n(l)) and a compact subset
G =
∏N
i=1G
i of U such that an optimal (or almost optimal)
policy pi∗ in the set ΠGl,n(l) for the cost Jl,n(l) is ε-optimal
for the original team problem when pi∗ = (pi1∗, . . . , piN∗) is
extended to Y via γi = pii∗ ◦Qil,n(l).
Proof. Fix any ε > 0. By Lemma 2 and Theorem 6, there
exists compact subset G of U of the form G =
∏N
i=1G
i such
that
lim
l,n→∞
inf
γ∈Γl,n∩ΓG
J(γ)− J∗ < ε.
For each l, n ≥ 1, let γ
l,n
∈ Γl,n∩ΓG be such that J(γl,n) <
infγ∈Γl,n∩ΓG J(γ) + 1/(n+ l). Define pil,n as the restriction
of γ
l,n
to the set Zl,n. Then, we have
J∗ + ε ≥ lim
l,n→∞
J(γ
l,n
)
= lim
l,n→∞
Jl,n(pil,n) (by Lemma 3)
≥ lim sup
l,n→∞
inf
pi∈ΠG
l,n
Jl,n(pi).
For the reverse inequality, for each l, n ≥ 1, let pil,n ∈ ΠGl,n be
such that Jl,n(pil,n) < infpi∈ΠG
l,n
Jl,n(pi) + 1/(n+ l). Define
γ
l,n
:= pil,n ◦Ql,n. Then, we have
lim inf
l,n→∞
inf
pi∈ΠG
l,n
Jl,n(pi) = lim inf
l,n→∞
Jl,n(pil,n)
= lim inf
l,n→∞
J(γ
l,n
) (by Lemma 3)
≥ J∗.
This completes the proof.
IV. APPROXIMATION OF DYNAMIC TEAM PROBLEMS
The results for the static case apply also to the dynamic
case, through a static reduction.
8A. Static Reduction of Sequential Dynamic Teams and Witsen-
hausen’s Equivalent Model
First we review the equivalence between sequential dynamic
teams and their static reduction (this is called the equivalent
model [5]). Consider a dynamic team setting according to
the intrinsic model where there are N decision epochs, and
Agent i observes yi ∼ ηi( · |ω,ui−1), and the decisions are
generated as ui = γi(yi). The resulting cost under a given
team policy γ is
J(γ) = E[c(ω,y,u)].
This dynamic team can be converted to a static team provided
that the following absolute continuity condition holds.
Assumption 4. For every i = 1, . . . , N , there exists a function
fi : Ω × Ui−11 × Yi → [0,∞), where Ui−11 :=
∏i−1
j=1 U
i
, and
a probability measure Qi on Yi such that for all S ∈ Yi we
have
ηi(S|ω,ui−1) =
∫
S
fi(ω,u
i−1, yi)Qi(dyi).
Therefore, for a fixed choice of γ, the joint distribution of
(w,y) is given by
P(dω, dy) = P(dω)
N∏
i=1
fi(ω,u
i−1, yi)Qi(dyi),
where ui−1 =
(
γ1(y1), . . . , γi−1(yi−1)
)
. The cost function
J(γ) can then be written as
J(γ) =
∫
Ω×Y
c(ω,y,u)P(dω)
N∏
i=1
fi(ω,u
i−1, yi)Qi(dyi)
=
∫
Ω×Y
c˜(ω,y,u)P˜(dω, dy),
where c˜(ω,y,u) := c(ω,y,u)
∏N
i=1 fi(ω,u
i−1, yi) and
P˜(dω, dy) := P(dω)
∏N
i=1Qi(dy
i). The observations now can
be regarded as independent, and by incorporating the fi terms
into c, we can obtain an equivalent static team problem. Hence,
the essential step is to appropriately adjust the probability
space and the cost function.
Remark 2. Note that in the static reduction method, some
nice properties (such as continuity and boundedness) of the
cost function c of the original dynamic team problem can
be lost, if the fi functions in Assumption 4 are not well-
behaved. However, the observation channels between w and
the yi are quite well-behaved for most of the practical models
(i.e, additive Gaussian channel) which admits static reduction.
Therefore, much of the nice properties of the cost function are
preserved for most of the practical models.
B. Approximation Results for Nonclassical Dynamic Teams
Admitting a Static Reduction
The next theorem is the main result of this section. It states
that for a class of dynamic team problems, finite models
can approximate an optimal policy with arbitrary precision.
In what follows, P˜l,n denotes the distribution of state and
observations in the finite model approximation of the static
reduction.
Theorem 8. Suppose Assumptions 2-(a),(b),(c),(e) and 4 hold.
In addition, for each i = 1, . . . , N , fi(w,ui−1, yi) is contin-
uous in ui−1 and yi, and
sup
u∈G
c(w,y,u)
N∏
i=1
fi(w,u
i−1, yi) is P˜l,n − uniformly integrable
for all compact G ⊂ U of the form G = ∏Ni=1Gi. Then,
the static reduction of the dynamic team model satisfies
Assumptions 2 and 3. Therefore, Theorems 6 and 7 hold for
the dynamic team problem. In particular, Theorems 6 and 7
hold for the dynamic team problems satisfying Assumptions 2,
3 and 4, if fi is bounded and continuous in ui−1 and yi for
each i = 1, . . . , N .
C. Approximation of Partially Nested Dynamic Teams
An important dynamic information structure is the partially
nested information structure. An IS is partially nested if
whenever uk affects yi for some k < i, Agent i has access to
yk; that is, there exists a measurable function fi,k : Yi → Yk
such that fi,k(yi) = yk for all γ ∈ Γ and all realizations
of ω. For such team problems, one talks about precedence
relationships among agents: Agent k is precedent to Agent i
(or Agent k communicates to Agent i), if the former agent’s
actions affect the information of the latter, in which case
(to be partially nested) Agent i has to have the information
based on which the action-generating policy of Agent k was
constructed.
Dynamic teams with such an information structure always
admit a static reduction through an informational equivalence.
For such partially nested (or quasi-classical) information struc-
tures, a static reduction was studied by Ho and Chu in the
context of LQG systems [39] and for a class of non-linear
systems satisfying restrictive invertibility properties [40].
For such dynamic teams, the cost function does not change
as a result of the static reduction, unlike in the static reduction
in Section IV-A. Therefore, if the partially nested dynamic
team satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3, then its static reduction
also satisfies it. Hence, Theorems 6 and 7 hold for such
problems.
Before proceeding to the next section, we prove an auxiliary
result which will be used in the next two sections.
Lemma 4. Let f and g be non-negative real functions defined
on metric spaces E1 and E2, respectively. Suppose
lim
R→∞
sup
n≥1
∫
{f>R}
f dµn = 0
lim
R→∞
sup
n≥1
∫
{g>R}
g dνn = 0
for some sequence of probability measures {µn} and {νn}.
Then, we have
lim
R→∞
sup
n
∫
{fg>R}
f(e1)g(e2) dµn ⊗ dνn = 0.
9Proof. Let En[f ] :=
∫
fdµn and Eˆn[g] :=
∫
gdνn. It is easy
to prove that supnEn[f ] =: a < ∞ and supn Eˆn[g] =: b <
∞. Note that {fg > R} ⊂ {f > √R} ∪ {g > √R}. Hence,∫
{fg>R}
f(e1)g(e2) dµn ⊗ dνn
≤
∫
{f>√R}
fg dµn ⊗ dνn +
∫
{g>√R}
fg dµn ⊗ dνn
= Eˆn[g]
∫
{f>√R}
f dµn + En[f ]
∫
{g>√R}
g dνn
≤ b
∫
{f>√R}
f dµn + a
∫
{g>√R}
g dνn.
Since the last term converges to zero as R →∞ by assump-
tion, this completes the proof.
V. APPROXIMATION OF WITSENHAUSEN’S
COUNTEREXAMPLE AND ASYMPTOTIC OPTIMALITY OF
QUANTIZED POLICIES
A. Witsenhausen’s Counterexample and its Static Reduction
In Witsenhausen’s celebrated counterexample [12] (see
Fig. 1), thare are two decision makers: Agent 1 observes a
zero mean and unit variance Gaussian random variable y1 and
decides its strategy u1. Agent 2 observes y2 := u1+ v, where
v is a standard (zero mean and unit variance) Gaussian noise
independent of y1, and decides its strategy u2.
γ1 + γ2
v
y1 u1 y
2
u2
Figure 1. Witsenhausen’s counterexample.
The cost function of the team is given by
c(y1, u1, u2) = l(u1 − y1)2 + (u2 − u1)2,
where l ∈ R+. Here, the state of the nature ω can be
regarded as a degenerate random variable. We let g(y) :=
1√
2pi
exp {−y2/2}. Then we have
P(y2 ∈ S|u1) =
∫
S
g(y2 − u1)m(dy2),
where m denotes the Lebesgue measure. Let
f(u1, y2) := exp
{− (u1)2 − 2y2u1
2
} (1)
so that g(y2−u1) = f(u1, y2) 1√
2pi
exp {−(y2)2/2}. The static
reduction proceeds as follows: for any policy γ, we have
J(γ) =
∫
c(y1, u1, u2)P(dy2|u1)δγ1(y1)(du1)Pg(dy1)
=
∫
c(y1, u1, u2)f(u1, y2)Pg(dy
2)Pg(dy
1),
where Pg denotes the standard Gaussian distribution. Hence,
by defining c˜(y1, y2, u1, u2) = c(y1, u1, u2)f(u1, y2) and
P˜(dy1, dy2) = Pg(dy
1)Pg(dy
2), we can write J(γ) as
J(γ) =
∫
c˜(y1, y2, u1, u2)P˜(dy1, dy2). (2)
hence, in the static reduction of Witsenhausen’s counterexam-
ple, agents observe independent zero mean and unit variance
Gaussian random variables.
B. Approximation of Witsenhausen’s Counterexample
In this section we study the approximation problem for
Witsenhausen’s counterexample by using the static reduction
formulation. We show that the conditions in Theorem 8
hold for Witsenhausen’s counterexample, and therefore, The-
orems 6 and 7 can be applied.
The cost function of the static reduction is given by
c˜(y1, y2, u1, u2) =
(
l(u1 − y1)2 + (u2 − u1)2)f(u1, y2),
where f(u1, y2) is given in (1). Note that the strategy spaces
of the original problem and its static reduction are identical,
and same strategies induce the same team costs. Recall that
Pg denotes the standard Gaussian distribution.
Lemma 5. For any (γ1, γ2) ∈ Γ1 × Γ2 with J(γ1, γ2) < ∞,
we have E
[
γi(yi)2
]
<∞.
Proof. To prove the lemma, we use the original problem setup
instead of its static reduction. Fix any strategy (γ1, γ2) with
finite cost. Since E
[
(u1 − y1)2] <∞ and u1 = (u1 − y1) +
y1, we have E
[
(u1)2
]
< ∞ via E[(u1)2]1/2 ≤ E[(u1 −
y1)2
]1/2
+ E
[
(y1)2
]1/2
. Then, we also have E
[
(u2)2
]
< ∞
since E
[
(u1−u2)2] <∞ and E[(u2)2]1/2 ≤ E[(u1)2]1/2+
E
[
(u1 − u2)2]1/2, completing the proof.
For any l ∈ R+, we define L := [−l, l]. Let ql,n denote the
uniform quantizer on L having n output levels; that is,
ql,n : L→ {y1, . . . , yn} ⊂ L
and
q−1(yj) =
[
yj − τ
2
, yj +
τ
2
)
,
where τ = 2ln . Let us extend ql,n to R by mapping R \ L
to y0 = 0. For each (l, n), let Zl,n := {y0, y1, . . . , yn} (i.e.,
output levels of the extended ql,n) and define the probability
measure Pl,n on Zl,n as
Pl,n(yi) = Pg(q
−1
l,n (yi)).
Moreover, let Πil,n := {pii : Zl,n → Ui, pii measurable} and
define
Jl,n(pi
1, pi2) :=
n∑
j,i=0
c˜(yi, yj , pi
1(yi), pi
2(yj))Pl,n(yi)Pl,n(yj).
With the help of Lemma 5, we now prove the following
result.
Proposition 3. Witsenhausen’s counterexample satisfies con-
ditions in Theorem 8.
Proof. Assumption 2-(a),(b),(c) and Assumption 4 clearly
hold. To prove Assumption 2-(e), we introduce the following
notation. For any strategy (γ1, γ2), we let Eγ1,γ2 denote
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the corresponding expectation operation. Pick (γ1, γ2) with
J(γ1, γ2) <∞. Since
Eγ1,γ2
[
Eγ1,γ2
[(
u1 − u2)2∣∣∣∣u1]] = Eγ1,γ2[(u1 − u2)2]
by the law of total expectation, there exists u1,∗ ∈ U1 such
that Eγ1,γ2
[(
u1 − u2)2∣∣u1 = u1,∗] <∞. Let u2,∗ = 0. Then
we have
J(γ1, γ2u2,∗) = Eγ1,γ2
u2,∗
[
l
(
u1 − y1)2 + (u1)2]
= Eγ1,γ2
[
l
(
u1 − y1)2 + (u1)2] <∞ (by Lemma 5)
and
J(γ1u1,∗ , γ
2) = Eγ1
u1,∗
,γ2
[
l
(
u1 − y1)2 + (u1 − u2)2]
= Eγ1,γ2
[
l
(
u1,∗ − y1)2]+ Eγ1,γ2[(u1 − u2)2∣∣∣∣u1 = u1,∗]
<∞.
Therefore, Assumption 2-(e) holds.
Note that for the Pl,n⊗Pl,n-uniform integrability condition,
it is sufficient to consider compact sets of the form [−M,M ]2
for some M ∈ R+, since any compact set in R2 is contained
in [−M,M ]2 for sufficiently large M ∈ R+. Let M ∈ R+.
We have
w1(y
1) := sup
(u1,u2)∈[−M,M ]2
l(u1 − y1)2 + (u2 − u1)2
= l
(
M + |y1|)2 + 4M2
and
sup
(u1,u2)∈[−M,M ]2
f(u1, y2) ≤ sup
(u1,u2)∈[−M,M ]2
exp {y2u1}
= exp {M |y2|} =: w2(y2).
For functions w1 and w2, we have
lim
R→∞
sup
n,l
∫
{w1(y1)>R}
w1(y
1) dPl,n
= lim
R→∞
sup
n,l
∫
{w1(y1)>R}
w1(ql,n(y
1)) dPg
≤ lim
R→∞
∫
{w1(y1)>R}
[
l
(
M + (|y1|+ 1)2)+ 4M2] dPg = 0
(3)
and
lim
R→∞
sup
n,l
∫
{w2(y2)>R}
w2(y
2) dPl,n
= lim
R→∞
sup
n,l
∫
{w2(y2)>R}
w2(ql,n(y
2)) dPg
≤ lim
R→∞
∫
{w2(y2)>R}
expM(|y2|+ 1) dPg = 0, (4)
where (3) and (4) follow from the facts that ql,n(R \ L) = 0
and the integrability of w1 and w2 with respect to the Pg.
By Lemma 4, the product w1w2 is Pl,n ⊗ Pl,n-uniformly
integrable. Therefore, sup(u1,u2)∈[−M,M ]2 c˜(y1, y2, u1, u2) is
also Pl,n ⊗ Pl,n-uniformly integrable. Since M is arbitrary,
this completes the proof.
Proposition 3 and Theorem 8 imply that Theorems 6 and
7 is applicable to Witsenhausen’s counterexample. Therefore,
an optimal strategy for Witsenhausen’s counterexample can
be approximated by strategies obtained from finite models.
The theorem below is the main result of this section. It states
that to compute a near optimal strategy for Witsenhausen’s
counterexample, it is sufficient to compute an optimal strategy
for the problem with finite observations obtained through
uniform quantization of the observation spaces.
Theorem 9. For any ε > 0, there exists (l, n(l)) and m ∈ R+
such that an optimal policy (pi1∗, pi2∗) in the set Π1,Ml,n(l) ×
Π2,Ml,n(l) for the cost Jl,n(l) is ε-optimal for Witsenhausen’s
counterexample when (pi1∗, pi2∗) is extended to Y1 × Y2 via
γi = pii∗ ◦ ql,n(l), i = 1, 2, where M := [−m,m] and
Πi,Ml,n(l) := {pii ∈ Πil,n(l) : pii(Zl,n) ⊂M}.
VI. THE GAUSSIAN RELAY CHANNEL PROBLEM AND
ASYMPTOTIC OPTIMALITY OF QUANTIZED POLICIES
A. The Gaussian Relay Channel Problem and its Static Re-
duction
An important dynamic team problem which has attracted
interest is the Gaussian relay channel problem (see Fig. 2)
[27], [28]. Here, Agent 1 observes a noisy version of the
state x which has Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
variance σ2x; that is, y1 := x + v0 where v0 is a zero mean
and variance σ20 Gaussian noise independent of x. Agent 1
decides its strategy u1 based on y1. For i = 2, . . . , N ,
Agent i receives yi := ui−1 + vi−1 (a noisy version of
the decision ui−1 of Agent i − 1), where vi−1 is a zero
mean and variance σ2i−1 Gaussian noise independent of
{x, v1, . . . , vi−2, vi, . . . , vN−1}, and decides its strategy ui.
+
v0
γ1 +
v1
γ2 +
v2
+
vN−1
γN
x y
1
u1 y
2
u2 y
N
uN
Figure 2. Gaussian relay channel.
The cost function of the team is given by
c(x,u) :=
(
uN − x)2 + N−1∑
i=1
li
(
ui
)2
,
where li ∈ R+ for all i = 1, . . . , N−1. To ease the notation in
the sequel, we simply take σx = σ0 = σ1 = . . . = σN−1 = 1.
Recall that g(y) := 1√
2pi
exp {−y2/2}. Then we have
P(y1 ∈ S|x) =
∫
S
g(y1 − x)m(dy1)
P(yi ∈ S|ui−1) =
∫
S
g(yi − ui−1)m(dyi), for i = 2, . . . , N.
Recall also that g(y−u) = f(u, y) 1√
2pi
exp {−(y)2/2} , where
f(u, y) is defined in (1). Then, for any policy γ, we have
J(γ) =
∫
X×Y
c(x,u)P(dx, dy)
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=
∫
X×Y
c(x,u)
[
f(x, y1)
N∏
i=2
f(ui−1, yi)
]
P
N+1
g (dx, dy),
where PN+1g denotes the product of N + 1 zero mean and
unit variance Gaussian distributions. Therefore, in the static
reduction of Gaussian relay channel, we have the compo-
nents c˜(x,y,u) := c(x,u)
[
f(x, y1)
∏N
i=2 f(u
i−1, yi)
]
and
P˜(dx, dy) = PN+1g (dx, dy). Analogous to Witsenhausen’s
counterexample, the agents observe independent zero mean
and unit variance Gaussian random variables.
B. Approximation of the Gaussian Relay Channel Problem
In this subsection, the approximation problem for the Gaus-
sian relay channel is considered using the static reduction
formulation. Analogous to Section V, we prove that the
conditions of Theorem 8 hold for Gaussian relay channel, and
so Theorems 6 and 7 can be applied.
The cost function of the static reduction is given by
c˜(x,y,u) := c(x,u)
[
f(x, y1)
N∏
i=2
f(ui−1, yi)
]
where f(u, y) is given in (1).
Recall the uniform quantizer ql,n on L := [l,−l] (l ∈ R+)
having n output levels from Section V. We extend ql,n
to R by mapping R \ L to y0 = 0. Recall also the set
Zl,n := {y0, y1, . . . , yn} and the probability measure Pl,n on
Zl,n given by
Pl,n(yi) = Pg(q
−1
l,n (yi)).
Define Πil,n := {pii : Zl,n → Ui, pii measurable} and
Jl,n(pi) :=
∫
X
∑
y∈∏N
i=1
Zl,n
c˜(x,y, pi(y))
N∏
i=1
Pl,n(yi)Pg(dx),
where pi := (pi1, . . . , piN ). Define P˜l,n(dx, dy) :=∏N
i=1 Pl,n(dyi)Pg(dx).
Proposition 4. The Gaussian relay channel problem satisfies
the conditions in Theorem 8.
Proof. It is clear that Assumption 2-(a),(b),(c) and Assump-
tion 4 hold. For any strategy γ, let Eγ denote the correspond-
ing expectation operation. To prove Assumption 2-(e), pick γ
with J(γ) < ∞. Analogous to Lemma 5, one can prove that
Eγ
[(
uN
)2]
< ∞. For any i = 1, . . . , N , by the law of total
expectation we can write
J(γ) = Eγ
[
Eγ
[
c(x,u)
∣∣ui]]
and
Eγ
[(
uN
)2]
= Eγ
[
Eγ
[(
uN
)2∣∣ui]].
Therefore, for each i = 1, . . . , N , there exists ui,∗ ∈ Ui such
that Eγ
[
c(x,u)
∣∣ui = ui,∗] <∞ and Eγ[(uN)2∣∣ui = ui,∗] <
∞. Then we have
J(γ−i, γiui,∗) = Eγ−i,γi
ui,∗
[(
uN − x)2 + N−1∑
j=1
lj
(
uj
)2]
≤ Eγ−i,γi
ui,∗
[
2x2 + 2
(
uN
)2
+
N−1∑
j=1
lj
(
uj
)2]
= Eγ
[i−1∑
j=1
lj
(
uj
)2
+ 2x2
]
+ Eγ
[
2
(
uN
)2
+
N−1∑
j=i
lj
(
uj
)2∣∣∣∣ui = ui,∗] <∞.
Therefore, Assumption 2-(e) holds.
Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3, for P˜l,n-uniform
integrability, it is sufficient to consider compact sets of the
form [−M,M ]N for some M ∈ R+. Choose any M ∈ R+.
Then we have
w1(x) := sup
u∈[−M,M ]N
(
uN − x)2 + N−1∑
i=1
li
(
ui
)2
=
(
M + x)2 +
N−1∑
i=1
liM
2
and
sup
u∈[−M,M ]N
N∏
i=2
f(ui−1, yi) ≤ sup
u∈[−M,M ]N
N∏
i=2
exp {yiui−1}
=
N∏
i=2
exp {M |yi|} =:
N∏
i=2
wi,2(y
i).
It can be proved as in the proof of Proposition 3 that wi,2
is Pl,n-uniformly integrable for each i = 2, . . . , N . Let
w˜1(x, y
1) := w1(x)f(x, y
1) and so∫
X×Y1
w˜1(x, y
1) exp {|x|} dP2g =
∫
X
w1(x) exp {|x|} dPg <∞.
Then, we have
lim
R→∞
sup
l,n
∫
{w˜1>R}
w˜1(x, y
1) dPl,ndPg
= lim
R→∞
sup
l,n
∫
{w˜1>R}
w˜1(x, ql,n(y
1)) dP2g
≤ lim
R→∞
∫
{w˜1>R}
w1(x) exp
{−x2 + 2xy1 + 2|x|
2
}
dP2g
= lim
R→∞
∫
{w˜1>R}
w˜1(x, y
1) exp {|x|} dP2g = 0.
Hence, by Lemma 4, the product w˜1
∏N
i=2 wi,2 is P˜l,n-
uniformly integrable. Therefore, supu∈[−M,M ]N c˜(x,y,u) is
also P˜l,n-uniformly integrable. Since M is arbitrary, this
completes the proof.
The preceding proposition and Theorem 8 imply, via The-
orems 6 and 7, that an optimal strategy for Gaussian relay
channel can be approximated by strategies obtained from finite
models. The following theorem is the main result of this
section.
Theorem 10. For any ε > 0, there exists (l, n(l)) and m ∈ R+
such that an optimal policy pi∗ in the set
∏N
i=1Π
i,M
l,n(l) for the
cost Jl,n(l) is ε-optimal for Gaussian relay channel when pi∗
is extended to Y via γi = pii∗ ◦ ql,n(l), i = 1, . . . , N , where
M := [−m,m] and Πi,Ml,n(l) := {pii ∈ Πil,n(l) : pii(Zl,n) ⊂M}.
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VII. DISCRETIZATION OF THE ACTION SPACES AND
ASYMPTOTIC OPTIMALITY OF FINITE MODEL
REPRESENTATIONS FOR TEAM PROBLEMS
For computing near optimal strategies for static team prob-
lems using numerical algorithms, the action spaces Ui must be
finite. In this section, we show that the action spaces can be
taken to be finite in finite observation models, if a sufficiently
large number of points are used for accurate approximation.
In this section, we consider the most general case studied in
Section III-B.
We note that the results that will be derived in this section
can be applied to the dynamic teams which admit static
reduction and satisfy conditions in Theorem 8.
Recall the finite observation models constructed in Sec-
tion III-B. For each (l, n), the finite model have the following
components:
{
X,Zil,n,U
i,W il,n( · |x), c,P, i ∈ N
}
, where X
is the state space, Zil,n is the observation space for Agent i,
Ui is the action space for Agent i, W il,n( · |x) observation
channel from state to the observation of Agent i, c is the cost
function, and P is the distribution of the state. Furthermore,
strategy spaces are defined as Πin,l :=
{
pii : Zil,n →
Ui, pii measurable
}
and Πl,n :=
∏N
i=1Π
i
l,n. Then the cost
function Jl,n : Πl,n → [0,∞) is given by
Jl,n(pi) :=
∫
X×Zl,n
c(x,y,u)Pl,n(dx, dy),
where pi = (pi1, . . . , piN ), u = pi(y), Zl,n =
∏N
i=1 Z
i
l,n, and
Pl,n(dx, dy) = P(dx)
∏N
i=1W
i
l,n(dy
i|x).
The theorem below is the main result of this section which
states that one can approximate optimal strategy in Πl,n by
strategies taking values in a finite set.
Theorem 11. Suppose that original static team problem satis-
fies Assumptions 2 and 3. Then, for each (l, n) and for any
ε > 0, there exist finite sets Uiε ⊂ Ui for i = 1, . . . , N such
that
inf
pi∈Πε
l,n
Jl,n(pi) < J
∗
l,n + ε,
where Πεl,n :=
{
pi ∈ Πl,n : pii(Zil,n) ⊂ Uiε, i ∈ N
}
.
Proof. Fix any (l, n) and ε. Let us choose piε ∈ Πl,n such
that
Jl,n(pi
ε) < inf
pi∈Πl,n
Jl,n(pi) +
ε
2
.
Note that for any i = 1, . . . , N , the range of pii,ε is a finite
subset of Ui and so, is contained in some compact and convex
subset Gi of Ui. Define G =
∏N
i=1G
i
.
Let ρi denote the metric on Ui. Since Gi is compact, one
can find a finite set Uik := {ui,1, . . . , ui,ik} ⊂ Gi which is a
1/k-net in Gi. Define Πik :=
{
pii ∈ ΠGil,n : pii(Zil,n) ⊂ Uik
}
and Πk =
∏N
i=1Π
i
k. For pii,ε, we let
pii,εk (y) := argmin
u∈Ui
k
ρi(pi
i,ε(y), u).
Hence
sup
y∈Zi
l,n
ρi(pi
i,ε(y), pii,εk (y)) < 1/k. (5)
We define piεk = (pi
1,ε
k , . . . , pi
N,ε
k ). Then we have
inf
pi∈Πk
Jl,n(pi)− inf
pi∈Πl,n
Jl,n(pi) < inf
pi∈Πk
Jl,n(pi)− Jl,n(piε) + ε
2
≤ Jl,n(piεk)− Jl,n(piε) +
ε
2
≤
∫
X×Zl,n
∣∣c(x,y, piεk)− c(x,y, piε)∣∣ dPl,n + ε2
The last integral converges to zero as k → ∞ by the
dominated convergence theorem since: (i) c(x,y, piεk) →
c(x,y, piε) as k → ∞ by (5) and Assumption 2-(a), (ii)
c(x,y, piεk), c(x,y, pi
ε) ≤ wG(x,y) for all (x,y) ∈ X × Zl,n,
and (iii) wG is Pl,n-integrable. Therefore, there exists suf-
ficiently large k0 such that the last expression is less than
ε. By choosing Uiε = Uik0 , for i = 1, . . . , N , the proof is
complete.
Consider the finite observation models introduced in Sec-
tion V that approximate the Witsenhausen’s counterexample.
For any m ∈ R+ and k ∈ R+, let qm,k : M → {u1, . . . , uk}
denote the uniform quantizer with k output levels (recall that
M := [−m,m]). Note that qm,k is a quantizer applied to
subsets of action spaces Ui = R, i = 1, 2 (not to be confused
with ql,n in Section V). The preceding theorem implies that
for each (l, n) and ε > 0, there exists a m ∈ R+ and k ∈ R+
such that
inf
pi∈Πm,k
l,n
Jl,n(pi) < J
∗
l,n + ε,
where Πm,kl,n :=
{
pi ∈ Πl,n : pii(Zil,n) ⊂ Um,k, i = 1, 2
}
and
Um,k = {u1, . . . , uk} is the set of output levels of qm,k.
Therefore, to compute a near optimal strategy for Witsen-
hausen’s counterexample, it is sufficient to compute an optimal
strategy for the finite model that is obtained through uniform
quantization of observation and action spaces (i.e., R) on finite
grids when the number of grid points is sufficiently large.
In particular, through constructing the uniform quantization
so that both the granular region and the granularity of
the quantizers are successively refined (that is the partitions
generated by the quantizers are successively nested), we have
the following proposition which lends itself to a numerical
algorithm.
Theorem 12. There exists a sequence of finite models obtained
through a successive refinement of the measurement and
action set partitions generated by uniform quantizers whose
optimal costs will converge to the cost of the Witsenhausen’s
counterexample.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Approximation of both static and dynamic team problems
by finite models was considered. Under mild technical con-
ditions, we showed that the finite model obtained by quan-
tizing uniformly the observation and action spaces on finite
grids provides a near optimal strategy if the number of grid
points is sufficiently large. Using this result, an analogous
approximation results were also established for the well-
known counterexample of Witsenhausen and Gaussian relay
channel. Our approximation approach to the Witsenhausen’s
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counterexample thus provides, to our knowledge, the first
rigorously established result that for any ε > 0, one can
construct an ε optimal strategy through an explicit solution
of a conceptually simpler problem.
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